



Kybernetika, Vol. 38 (2002), No. 3, [339]--352
Persistent URL: http://dml.cz/dmlcz/135468
Terms of use:
© Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR, 2002
Institute of Mathematics of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic provides access to digitized
documents strictly for personal use. Each copy of any part of this document must contain these
Terms of use.
This paper has been digitized, optimized for electronic delivery and stamped with
digital signature within the project DML-CZ: The Czech Digital Mathematics Library
http://project.dml.cz
K Y B E R N E T I K A — VOLUME 3 8 ( 2002) , NUMBER 3, P A G E S 3 3 9 - 3 5 2 
COALITIONAL FUZZY PREFERENCES1 
MILAN MAREŠ 
The paper deals with the concept of coalitional preferences in the group decision-making 
situations in which the agents and coalitions have only vague idea about the compara-
tive acceptability of particular outcomes. The coalitional games with vague utilities (see, 
e.g., [7]) can serve for a good example when some types of the game solutions (e.g., the 
von Neumann-Morgenstern one) are to be extended to the fuzzy game case. In this pa-
per, we consider the fuzzy analogies of coalitional preferences and coalitional domination 
concepts known from the deterministic optimization models. These coalitional preferences 
are derived from the individual preferences of the coalition members. In the fuzzy exten-
sion of the model the input individual preferences are represented by fuzzy relations and, 
consequently, also the coalitional preferences have to be fuzzy. The general properties of 
these coalitional preferences are discussed in this contribution, and they are compared with 
the situation in the deterministic model. Finally, the case when the fuzziness of the indi-
vidual preferences follows from fuzziness of the utility functions over the outcomes of the 
decision-making is mentioned and discussed. 
1. HEURISTIC INTRODUCTION 
In many of the decision-making situations the decisions are accepted not only indi-
vidually but also as a result of some coalitional mechanism. Even in this case the 
decision accepted by a coalition has to respect the principle of individual rationality 
and the demands of all individual members of the coalition. The ability of a coalition 
to offer such uniformly acceptable policy of its decision-making is a necessary condi-
tion for its existence or, better, for its ability to result from the negotiation process. 
This fact has a significant representation, e.g., in the coalitional game theory and 
bargaining models. 
In the classical theory of games and related models of optimization the indi-
vidual preferences of players (or agents) are considered to be exactly determined. 
Consequently, also the coalitional preferences derived from them are deterministic. 
Seemingly, this approach appears to be rational. Individual agent usually knows 
what he wants. On the other hand, if the results of the decision-making are rep-
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resented by material objects (like goods, agricultural or industrial products, e tc) , 
working activities or business advantages, then the assumption about'the strictly 
determined preferences need not be so self evident. In the contrary, real agent can 
prefer some of the outcomes against others only with some degree of uncertainty. In 
such situation, his preferences appear to be vague, and we are dealing with fuzzy 
preference relation, i. e., with fuzzy ordering relation over outcomes of the decisions. 
In the following sections, we process such individual fuzzy preferences, namely, 
we derive the group (coalitional) fuzzy preference relations from them, and com-
pare them with the properties of their deterministic counterparts. In the following, 
second, section we briefly recall the classical concept of deterministic coalitional pref-
erences. In the third section we, also briefly, specify the individual fuzzy preferences 
which are considered herev. Section 4 is devoted to the coalitional fuzzy preference 
relation defined as a superposition of the individual preferences of the coalition mem-
bers. In the next, fifth, section we present and discuss the situation in which the 
individual fuzzy preferences are derived from fuzzy utility functions. The paper is 
concluded by several brief remarks. 
In the paper we respect and preserve the usual terminology of the theory of coali-
tional games, and use the term "domination" for particular cases of the coalitional 
preference relation. 
2. DETERMINISTIC COALITIONAL PREFERENCES 
In the theory of coalitional games (see, e.g., [4, 8, 9]) the individual preferences of 
players are represented by ordering relations over the set of possible outcomes of the 
game. 
Let us denote by I the (finite and non-empty) set of players and by Xthe (non-
empty) set of possible outcomes. 
In most of the following sections we suppose that the outcomes are real objects 
or services like goods, comparative business advantages, working support, moral 
support, social position which hardly can be evaluated by a deterministic values of 
some utility. Anyhow, they can be in some cases connected with vague utilities. To 
introduce necessary formal tools for the fuzzification of both approaches, we present 
concepts connected with each of them. 
2.1. Preferences without utilities 
Let us consider a player i G / . By symbol £* we denote the preference scale of 
the player i as a complete ordering relation over the set X. It means for any two 
outcomes x j G l 
x>ZiV (!) 
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means that player i (weakly) prefers x to y and the usual properties of such ordering, 
namely, for x, y, z G X 
(completeness) .r^2/or?/^ x, (2) 
(reflexivity) x £* x, (3) 
(semiantisymmetry) if x^y and y >Zi x then both outcomes (4) 
are considered to be equivalent, 
(transitivity) if x £ ; y and y >Zi z then x >^i z (5) 
are fulfilled. 
This preference relation can be extended to coalitions of players. In such case 
it is called domination via coalition. If K C I, K ^ 0, is a coalition, i.e., a set of 
players, and x j G l then we say that x dominates y via coalition K and write 
x dom/^ y (6) 
iff 
for all i G K, x & y, (7) 
for some j G If, relation y >^i x does not hold. 
It is evident and generally known that such relation of domination is not gener-
ally complete (property (2) need not be fulfilled), as well as the reflexivity does 
not hold (property (3)). On the other hand, the semiantisymmetry (5) turns into 
antisymmetry 
if x dom^ y then never y dom^ x. (8) 
The transitivity (5) is always fulfilled. If one-player coalition {i}, i G I, is considered 
then if x dom{;} y when x ^ j but not y>Z%x. 
In the coalitional games theory, it is usual to consider also general domination. 
If x, y G X are outcomes then we say that x dominates y and write 
x dom y (9) 
iff there exists a (non-empty) coalition K such that x dom/c y. 
It is easy to see that the relation of general domination is neither complete nor 
reflexive. Moreover, it can be neither semiantisymmetric nor antisymmetric, and 
it need not be even transitive. In this sense, it is difficult to consider it for an 
ordering. Anyhow, in the game theory it is a significant relation, e.g., in the theory 
of von Neumann solution (see [4, 8, 9]). 
2.2. Preferences with utilities 
It is possible under some conditions which are exactly fdrmulated in the utility 
theory, to substitute the qualitative orderings ^ , i G / , by quantitative numerical 
scale whose values characterize the acceptability of particular outcomes for a given 
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player. In our paper, we consider this situation for vague knowledge of these scales 
in Section 5. 
Formally, the quantitative scale representing the preferences £;*, i G / , is char-
acterized by utility functions Ui, i G / , over the set X. Their values Ui(x) give the 
quantitative evaluation of the utility of the outcome x for player i G / . It is defined 
in such way that for any x, y G X and i £ I 
Ui(x)>Ui(y) iSx^iy. (10) 
Due to this condition, it is easy to transfer the properties of ^ into the natural 
properties of numerical ordering > where condition (5) turns into 
if Ui(x) > Ui(y) and Ui(y) > Ui(x) then Ui(x) = Ui(y). (11) 
The definition of domination via a coalition K easily transforms into the following 
relation: 
xdouiK y iff Ui(x) > Ui(y) for all i G K, 
Uj(x) > Uj(y) for some j G K. 
The properties of such domination via coalition, as well as of the general domination 
defined by means of it are completely analogous to the previous case. 
3. INDIVIDUAL FUZZY PREFERENCE 
In fact, there are not so many cooperative situations (e.g., coalitional games, group 
decision-making procedures, some market processes, etc.) in which the preferences of 
their participants are as deterministic as they were described in the previous section. 
Namely in the case when the outcomes for particular players are not represented 
by money but by some material or moral advantages, the preferences need not be 
strictly given. There exists natural vagueness of the preferences of players which can 
be represented by vague ordering relation over the set of outcomes. 
Even in this (and all the following) chapter we preserve the denotation / for the 
set of players and X for the set of outcomes. 
The vague preferences of each individual player i G / are here represented by 
fuzzy ordering relation £ f over the set X. It means that £ f can be identified with 
a fuzzy subset of the Cartesian product X x X with membership function 
*/(•,•) : X x X - > [ 0 , l ] 
where the value vl(xyy) for i G / , x, y G X, represents the possibility that player 
i prefers x to y. Fuzzy orderings may be relations with a rich structure (see, e.g., 
[2, 3]). In this case we consider the following properties for desirable: for x, y, z G X, 
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iel 
(completeness) value vl(x,y) is defined for any pair (12) 
x, y e X, 
(fuzzy reflexivity) vl(x,x) = 1, (13) 
(fuzzy semiantisymmetry) vl(x,y) > 1 — vl(y,x), and the value (14) 
vl(x,y)-\-vl(y,x) — 1 represents the pos-
sibility that outcomes x, y are consid-
ered to be equivalent for player i, 
(fuzzy tranzitivity) vl(x,z) >mm(vl(x,y),vl(y,z)). (15) 
The fuzzy ordering relations £ f fulfilling the previous properties will be in this 
paper processed as individual fuzzy preference relation. 
Some of the just presented desired properties of fuzzy individual preferences are 
rather discutable. The fuzzy completeness and fuzzy reflexivity are relatively clear 
and they obviously reflect analogous properties of the ordering > of real numbers. 
Also the fuzzy transitivity appears acceptable - it expresses the intuitive idea that 
there may exist also other (may be stronger) reasons for the opinion that x £ f z 
than deriving the relation via third outcome y e X. This property may be discussed 
but it belongs, at least, among the most acceptable ones. Rather different situation 
appear in the case of fuzzy semiantisymmetry. Its deterministic counterpart (5) 
is rather a construction than a definition of property - it simply stresses the fact 
that some pairs of outcomes can be acceptable on an equal level. The dogmatic 
transcription of (5) into the language of fuzzy sets could be, e.g., 
mm{vl(x,y), vl(y,x)) 
is the possibility that x and y are equivalent (i. e. the possibility that parallelly x £ f y 
and y £ f x). Anyhow, the heuristical interpretation of such condition seems to be 
rather difficult, even hardly understandable. Condition of fuzzy semiantisymmetry, 
as formulated in (14), has an easy interpretation: The possibility that y £ f x 
cannot be smaller than the possibility that x £ f y is not valid; if it is greater then 
the difference characterizes the possibility that both outcomes are equivalent from 
the point of view of player i. This interpretationally reasonable formulation can 
cause some problems when it is transformed into the fuzzy coalitional preferences. 
Nevertheless, the alternative approach mentioned above causes some other problems, 
as well. 
4. COALITIONAL FUZZY PREFERENCES 
Analogously to the deterministic case, even the individual fuzzy preferences can be 
extended to some coalitional relation representing the collective coalitional accept-
ability of particular outcomes. The coalitional fuzzy preferences are, analogously to 
the individual ones, represented by a binary relation over the set of outcomes X. 
As this relation is derived from the fuzzy relations of individual preferences, it is 
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evident that it is to be also fuzzy. If K C / , K ^ 0, is a coalition then we call the 
relation as fuzzy domination via coalition and for any pair x, y G X we write 
x dom^ y 
and read x fuzzy dominates y via K. As the fuzzy domination is a fuzzy relation, it 
is represented by a fuzzy subset of the Cartesian product X x X. Its membership 
function will be denoted by vK(-, •), where for every pair (x,y) e X x X the value 
vK(x,y) G [0,1] denotes the possibility with which xdom^y. The membership 
function is defined as follows. For every coalition K C / , K / 0, and every pair of 
outcomes x, y G X 
vK(x,y) = min [mm(vl(x,y) : i G if),max((l - vl(y,x)) : i G K)] . (16) 
If we compare (16) with (6) and (7), we can see that the coalitional fuzzy domi-
nation via a coalition copies the concept of the corresponding deterministic relation 
formulated in the language of fuzzy sets. Namely, 
min (vl(x,y) :i G K) 
determines the possibility that 
x £ f y for all i G K, 
and 
max ((1 - vl(x, y)) : i G K) 
similarly determines the possibility that the relation 
y yj x does not hold for some j G K. 
R e m a r k 1. An immediate consequence of (16) and (14) is that for one-player 
coalition {i} the possibility that x domf^ y fulfills 
1 - vl(y,x) = v{%}(x,y) = min (vl(x,y), 1 - vl(y,x)) < vl(x,y), x, y G X. 
L e m m a 1. For every coalition K and outcomes x, y, 
vK(x,y) = min [rnin(i/(x,2/) : i G K), 1 — min(vl(y,x) : i G K)] , 
and, if the property (14) is fulfilled then also 
mm(vl(x,y) : i G K) > vK(x,y) > 1 — max(vl(y,x) : i G K). 
P r o o f . The former equality immediately follows from (16). The latter one is 
also an immediate consequence of the definitoric formula (16) and of the assumption 
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(14). Namely 
mm(vl(x,y) : i G K) = min [min(vl(x,y) : i G If), max(vl(x,y) : i G K)] 
> min [mm(vl(x,y) :i G If), max(l - vl(y,x) : i G K)] 
= vK(x,y) 
= min [mm(vl(x,y) :i G If), max(l - vl(y,x) : i G K)] 
> min [min(l - vl(yy x) : i G If), max(l - v
l(y, x) : i G If)] 
= min(l - i/(y, x) : i G If) = 1 - max(vl(y, x) : i G If). D 
Remark 2. For any one-player coalition {i} evidently vl(x,y) > v^(x,y) > 
1 ~ v%(y,x) as follows from Lemma 1. 
As we would like to know how much the coalitional fuzzy preferences, i.e., the 
domination via coalition, can be considered for fuzzy ordering, it is useful to check 
in what degree it fulfills the desired properties (12), (13), (14), (15). 
First, as the membership function vl(x,y) is defined for any pair of outcomes 
(x,y), the fuzzy domination via coalition is complete and (12) is fulfilled. In this 
sense the fuzzy domination is more satisfactory than its deterministic counter-
part (6). 
Lemma 2. If If is a coalition and x is an outcome then vK(x,x) = 0, if (13) is 
fulfilled. 
P r o o f . The statement follows from (13) and (16) immediately. Due to (13) 
vl(x, x) = 1 for all i G I and then 1 — vl(x, x) = 0. It means that the minimum (16) 
vanishes. • 
The previous lemma means that the fuzzy domination relation via a coalition is 
certainly not reflexive. This result is comparable with analogous property of the 
deterministic relation (6). 
The situation becomes less clear if we analyze the fuzzy semiantisymmetry (14) of 
the individual preferences and its reflection in the coalitional preferences. Consider-
ing the deterministic counterparts of these fuzzy phenomena, namely (5) and (8), as 
well as other related properties, we can see that the "weak" individual preference £» 
(similar to the weak inequality >) was transformed by means of (6), (7) into "strict" 
coalitional preferences "dom/r" (similar to strong inequality >). It means that the 
semiantisymmetry of individual preferences turns into antisymmetry of coalitional 
preferences. If we transmit this view on the deterministic preferences to their fuzzy 
analogies, we could expect the validity of a relation like 
vK{x,y)<i-vK{y,x)- (17) 
Even more, the difference between these two values would represent the possibility 
that both outcomes are equivalent. This our expectation is justified by the following 
statement. 
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L e m m a 3. For every x, y G X and every coalition K C I, K ^ 0, if (14) holds 
then 
vK(x,v)<l-"K(v,x). 
P r o o f . Due to the definitoric relation (16) 
vK(x,y) = min [mm(vl(x,y) : i G K),max(\ — vl(y,x) : i G K)] 
= min [min(l - 1 + vl(x,y) : i G K),max(l - vl(y,x) : i G K)] 
= min [min(l - (1 - vl(x, y)) : i G K), max(l - vl(y, x) : i G K)] 
= min [l - max(l - vl(x,y)) :i G K),\ — mm(vl(y,x) : i G K)] 
= 1 — max^[max(l — vl(x,y) : i G K),mm(vl(y,x) : i G X)] 
< 1 - min [max(l - vl(x,y) : i G K),mm(vl(y,x) : i G K)] 
= \-vK(y,x). • 
Finally, let us consider the property of fuzzy transitivity formalized in (15). In 
the deterministic case the transitivity of the individual preferences implies the same 
property for the coalitional preferences. If the fuzzy preferences are considered then 
the validity of (15) even for the membership functions vK (•, •) is not guaranteed. 
Fuzziness is not friendly to the transitivity. On a more general level, this phe-
nomenon was discussed in [6], and it appears even here. However the individual 
preferences are supposed to be transitive in the sense of (15), this property is not 
transferred to the coalitional fuzzy domination via a coalition, as illustrated by the 
following examples. 
Example 1. Let us consider a coalition K C / , K / 0, such that for some triple 
of outcomes x, y, z G X and for all players i G K 
v\x,y) = \, v\y,x) = 0, 
v\y,z) = \, v{(z,y) = \/3, 
v\x,z) = \, v\z,x) = \/2. 
These individual fuzzy preferences posses all demanded properties including the 
transitivity. The coalitional fuzzy preferences derived from them by (16) are 
vK(x,y) = \, vK(y,x)=0, 
vK(y,z) = 2/3, vK(z,y) = 0, 
vK(x,z) = 1/2, vK(z,x) = 0 . 
(The previous data also illustrate the transformation of the semiantisymmetry of 
the individual preferences into the antisymmetry of the coalitional ones.) We also 
see, that 
vK(x,z) = 1/2 < min {vK(x,y), vK(y,z)) = 2/3. 
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This example illustrates also the achievability of the equality, when 
vK{z,x) = 0 = min {vK{z,y), vK{y,z)) . 
The opposite inequality can be also achieved, as shown in the next example. 
Example 2. Let K = {1,2}, and let 
vx{x,y) = 1, vl{y,x) = 1/2, v2{x,y) = 0, v2{y,x) = 1, 
vx{y,z) = l, v\z,y) = 1/2, v2{y,z) = 0, v2{z,y) = l, 
vx{x,z) = l, vl{z,x) = l/2, v2{x,z) = l/2, v2{z,x) = l/2. 
Then 
vK{x,y) = 0, vK{y,x) = l/2, 
vK{y,z) = 0, vK{z,y) = 1/2, 
vK{x,z) = l/2, vK{z,x) = l/2, 
and we can see that 
vK(x,z) = 1/2 > min {vK(x,y), vK(y,z)) = 0. 
Also in this case the equality takes place, as 
vK(z,x) = 1/2 = min (vK(z,y), vK(y,x)) . 
Note that there is a very significant difference between the elementary properties 
of the individual fuzzy preferences of a player i E I, represented by vl(x, y), and those 
of the one-player coalition {i} whose coalitional fuzzy preferences are represented by 
fuzzy domination via {z}, represented by v^(x, y). Not only vl(x, x) = 1 meanwhile 
v^(x,x) = 0, but also the fuzzy semiantisymmetry of i, vl(x,y) > l — vl(y,x), turns 
into antisymmetry of {z}, v^(x,y) < 1 - v^(y,x). Moreover, as the-coalition K 
in Example 1 can be also of a single player, K = {i}, then also the fuzzy transitivity 
of vl can turn into its opposite for v^. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon 
follows quite naturally from the essential difference between "weak" ordering yf 
and "strict" domination via coalition dom^. It exists even in the deterministic case 
(except the problem with transitivity), and belongs to basic conceptual properties 
of both approaches to the preferences. It can be changed if we use an alternative 
definition of fuzzy domination via coalition, as briefly mentioned in the Conclusive 
Remarks. This modified domination corresponds with a "weak" ordering relation 
for a given coalition, and it bears corresponding methodological discrepancies. 
For the one-players coalitions {z}, i G J, the following relation holds: 
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L e m m a 4. If i £ / , {i} is a one-player coalition and x, y, z £ X then 
v{i} (x,z)< max (i/{i> (x, y), */{i> (y, zj\ . 
P r o o f . Due to Remark 1, u^(x,y) = l-vi(y,x) for any x, y. Then (15) implies 
vW(x,z) = l-i/l(z,x) < l-min(ui(z,y),ui(y,x)) 
= max (l-vl(z,y), l-u{(y,z)) = max (u^(x,y), v^(y,z)Sj. D 
It remains to discuss the fuzzy version of the most extensive domination concept, 
namely the general domination. In the deterministic case it was, for any x, y £ X 
denoted by x dom y and it was valid iff there existed a nonempty coalition K C I 
such that xdom^ y. In the case of fuzzy preferences, the general fuzzy domination 
is, necessarily, a fuzzy relation over the Cartesian product X x X with membership 
function which we denote 
" ( v ) . 
Analogously to the deterministic case we say that x generally fuzzy dominates y and 
write 
xdomFy, x, y £ X (18) 
with the possibility v(x,y) given by 
v(x, y) = max(vK(x, y) : K C / , K ?- 0). (19) 
There are not so many provable properties of the general fuzzy domination. It 
is evident that it is complete as the membership function is defined for any pair of 
outputs x, y. Hence, property (12) is fulfilled. Moreover, as 
vK(x,x) = 0 for any K C J, K ^ 0, x £ X, 
then also 
v(x, x) = 0 for each x 
and in this sense the reflexivity (13) turns into antireflexivity. It is impossible to 
derive any general results regarding the antisymmetry or semiantisymmetry (see 
(14), (17)), and the relation of general fuzzy domination cannot be transitive (see 
(15)) if its deterministic pattern is not generally transitive. 
The previous results display a disappointing conclusion. The fuzzification of the 
model of preferences underlines the phenomenon observable in the deterministic 
model, already. Namely, certain disconsistency between the individual, coalitional 
and general preferences, however they are connected by means of a consistent and 
natural procedure of derivation. This discrepancy is inherent for the coalitional or 
group decision making and the fuzzification cannot avoid it. 
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5. FUZZINESS OF UTILITIES 
As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, in some cases the deterministic individual prefer-
ences £;* can be represented by a numerical scale of utilities connected with particu-
lar outcomes and associated with individual players. Then the individual preference 
scale can be directly derived from the utilities (or vice-versa) due to (10). If it is so 
then the eventual vagueness being present in the modelled approach of players need 
not be represented by defining fuzzy preferences yf but, rather indirectly, by fuzzi-
fication of the utility values Ui(x). They can be considered to be fuzzy quantities 
with membership functions 
tf(-):R->[0.1]. 
If we choose this way, we can use fuzzy analogies to the procedures described 
in Subsection 2.2. Anyhow, even in such case we finally usually return to fuzzy 
ordering relations by means of the fuzzification of the inequalities between fuzzy 
utility values. 
The ordering of fuzzy quantities is a complex and widely investigated problem. 
There exist several very different approaches to it and, consequently, many different 
definitions of the ordering relation. The most significant of them are summarized in 
[2] and [3]. Here, we mention one of them which is based on the idea that ordering 
of fuzzy quantities is to be a fuzzy relation. It means that it is characterized by a 
fuzzy subset of the 2-dimensional space of fuzzy quantities (see also [5, 6]). 
Preserving the notation of the previous sections, we want to compare for every 
player i the utilities connected (from his point of view) with the outcomes x, y. It 
means that we want to specify in what degree (with which possibility) 
Ui(x) > Ui(y) 
in the fuzzy set theoretical sense. Here, we define this possibility as a number 
*vl(x,y) defined by 
*vi{x,y)= sup [min(Aif(r), /*?(*))] (20) 
r, seR,r>s 
for each i G / , x, y G X. 
The previous considerations can be illustrated by the following example. 
Example 3. Let us consider the set X = {x,y,z} and a player i e I with prefer-
ences >zi such that z >i y and y >i x. Let us suppose, further, that these prefer-
ences can be quantitatively evaluated by a deterministic utility function Ui, where 
Ui(x) = 0, Ui(y) = 1, Ui(z) = 2. Finally, let us suppose that the utility function was 
fuzzified to fuzzy function uf the values of which are fozzy quantities uf (x), uf (y), 
uf(z) with membership functions /i?, /xV, /if, respectively, where 
#i?(0 = e + 1 for te [-1,0], fiUO = l - € for £G [0,1], 
/i?(0 = £ for te [0,1], m) = 2 - f for £G [1,2], 
M*(£) = f/4 + 1/2 for £G [-2,2], /i?(£) = 3 - £ for f 6 [2,3], 
tf(0 = O, A*f(0 = 0> tf(0=O else. 
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Then it is possible to derive, by means of (20), the fuzzy preference relation yf with 
membership function Vi(-, •) : X x X —> [0,1]. It can be easily verified that 
Vi(y,x) = v{(z,y) = v{(z,x) = 1, v{(x,x) = v{(y,y) = v{(z,z) = 1, 
v{(x,y) = 1/2, Vi(y,z) = 2/3, v{(x,z) = 1/3. 
Evidently, i/i(-,-) fulfils properties (12), (13) and (14) but not (15). 
The above definition is not the unique possible one but it can be easily and natu-
rally heuristically interpreted. Unfortunately, its formal properties are not as pleas-
ant as we could wish. Namely, it does not fulfil the fuzzy transitivity property (15) 
(cf. [6]). Consequently, also the coalitional and general fuzzy dominations derived 
from it by (16) and (19) cannot possess this property. Of course, it is also possible to 
construct another definition of individual fuzzy preferences based on the comparison 
of fuzzy utilities which fulfils (12) - (15). As there exist also crisp orderings of fuzzy 
relations, it is possible to turn the whole problem into its deterministic version with 
crisp individual (and, consequently, also coalitional) preferences, as well. 
6. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The previous sections have presented an elementary view on the fuzzification of 
the individual and coalitional preference concept which is, e.g., widely used in the 
coalitional game theory. It is, namely, the basic concept for the definition and 
investigation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of cooperative games. If it 
is to be extended to coalitional games with vague idea about the expected pay-offs 
(i.e., with fuzzy pay-offs or fuzzy preferences), the good management of individual 
and coalitional fuzzy preferences is necessary. 
Those readers who are specialists in the theory of triangular norms have certainly 
recognized the close relation between formula (14) and the Lukasiewicz £-norm. It 
is possible to apply some other t-norms instead of it. Generally the theory of fuzzy 
preferences which would be based on the theory of t-norms remains an open field for 
further investigation. 
In the conclusive paragraph of Section 4, we have already mentioned certain 
inconsistency between the individual and coalitional fuzzy preferences. As it can 
be observed in Section 2, this discrepancy comes from the deterministic preference 
relations, and the fuzzification only stresses its unpleasantness. It mainly follows 
from the fact that meanwhile the individual preferences are introduced as a "weak" 
ordering with reflexivity, the coalitional preferences are "strict" and they exclude the 
reflexivity. This disproportionality of the deterministic model is here transmitted 
into its fuzzified counterpart, and its consequences are even more painful. 
There exists a possibility which was avoided by the deterministic theory but which 
can be quite rational in the fuzzy approach thanks to more soft relation between 
"weak" and "strict" inequality of fuzzy objects. 
In the deterministic case this modification consists in the introduction of "weak" 
coalitional domination via K 
xDom/rs/, x,yel, K C I, K # 0 (21) 
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being valid iff 
x >Zi y for all i e K. (22) 
In the deterministic case this domination is generally not complete (2), but it is 
reflexive (3), the semiantisymmetry (5) holds in the same form in which it holds for 
the individual preferences, and the transitivity (5) is also preserved. 
More important consequence of this definition of "weak" domination via coalition 
is that its analogy for fuzzy preferences is much simpler than (16). The "weak" 
coalitional fuzzy preference is even in this case defined as a fuzzy relation over the 
set of outputs. We call it weak coalitional fuzzy domination, write xDomKy, and 
its membership function will be denoted by 
VK(x,y), KCI, K^%, x, yeX, 
where 
VK(x, y) = min(i/0r, y):ieK). (23) 
Lemma 1, as well as a simple comparison of (16) and (23) show that 
vK(Xiy) > vK(x,y) for any K C I, x, y E X. 
Moreover, this weak domination displays quite pleasant formal properties. It is 
evidently reflexive, and transitive as follows from (23) and (13), (14), (15), and, of 
course, it is also complete as the values of membership function VK(x, y) are defined 
for any K, x, y. 
The situation becomes less pleasant in the case of the semiantisymmetry which 
we could expect from the "weak" coalitional domination. It can be shown that for 
VK(-, •) defined by (23) neither VK(x, y) > 1 - VK(y, x) nor VK(x, y) < 1 - VK(y, x) 
can be guaranteed. 
Example 4. Let us consider two-players coalition K = {1,2} such that for a pair 
x,y e X 
v1(x,y) = l/3, i/1(y,x) = l> 
v2(x,y) = l, ^2(2/,x) = l / 3 . 
Then due to (23) 
VK(x,y) = 1/3 < 1 - VK(y,x) = 2/3. 
If we, on the other hand, put 
v1(x,y)=2/3, v1(y,x) = l, 
v2(x,y) = l, ^2(2/,*) = 2/3, 
then VK(x,y) = 2/3 > 1 -VK(y,x) = 1/3. 
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It can be easily seen that also the "weak" general fuzzy domination derived from 
this relation does not display analogously pleasant consistency with the original 
individual fuzzy preferences, as even its deterministic pattern does. 
The previous sections of this paper, as well as these conclusive remarks, show 
that the concepts of coalitional fuzzy preferences and general fuzzy preferences offer 
an inspirative field for further research, development of the general theory and also 
for its application in the fuzzy coalitional games, fuzzy group decision making and 
other models of the group behaviour. 
(Received January 30, 2002.) 
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